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Emotion has no impact on attention
in a change detection flicker task
Robert C. A. Bendall* and Catherine Thompson
Directorate of Psychology and Public Health, School of Health Sciences, University of Salford, Salford, UK
Past research provides conflicting findings regarding the influence of emotion on visual
attention. Early studies suggested a broadening of attentional resources in relation to
positive mood. However, more recent evidence indicates that positive emotions may
not have a beneficial impact on attention, and that the relationship between emotion
and attention may be mitigated by factors such as task demand or stimulus valence.
The current study explored the effect of emotion on attention using the change detection
flicker paradigm. Participants were induced into positive, neutral, and negative mood
states and then completed a change detection task. A series of neutral scenes were
presented and participants had to identify the location of a disappearing item in each
scene. The change was made to the center or the periphery of each scene and it
was predicted that peripheral changes would be detected quicker in the positive mood
condition and slower in the negative mood condition, compared to the neutral condition.
In contrast to previous findings emotion had no influence on attention and whilst central
changes were detected faster than peripheral changes, change blindness was not
affected by mood. The findings suggest that the relationship between emotion and
visual attention is influenced by the characteristics of a task, and any beneficial impact
of positive emotion may be related to processing style rather than a “broadening” of
attentional resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The visual world is cluttered and it is impossible to attend to all items and areas simultaneously.
Priority is therefore given to the most relevant areas or objects within a scene. This ‘biasing’ of
attentional resources, known as selective visual attention, is subject to a range of inﬂuences and is
dependent upon top–down and bottom–up processing. Top–down processing is characterized by
goal-directed behavior, for example the allocation of attention to items matching target-deﬁning
features and the inhibition of distractors (Shiﬀrin and Schneider, 1977; Driver and Bayliss, 1989).
In contrast, bottom–up processing is the automatic capture of attention by salient information
in the environment, regardless of task demand (e.g., Itti and Koch, 2000). It should, however, be
noted that that the top–down and bottom–up viewpoint cannot adequately explain all attentional
processing (Awh et al., 2012). Attention has also been shown to be biased by statistical irregularities
learned over time that cannot be explained by top–down or bottom–up processing (Zhao et al.,
2013).
Traditionally, research in the ﬁeld of visual attention has focused on the inﬂuences common
to all individuals, for instance task demand (e.g., Henderson et al., 1999), past experience (e.g.,
Brockmole and Henderson, 2006), stimuli properties (e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980), and visual
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biases (e.g., Tatler, 2007). However, more recent work has
explored inﬂuences upon visual attention that vary between
individuals, such as individual diﬀerences and expertise (e.g.,
Sobel et al., 2007; Konstantopoulos et al., 2010). One such
inﬂuence is the eﬀect of emotion, and the number of studies
investigating the impact of emotion on visual attention (and
cognition in general) is growing rapidly.
A predominant model in this ﬁeld is the broaden-and-build
theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001). The theory proposes that
positive emotions, including joy, interest, contentment, pride,
and love, have the ability to “broaden” an individual’s “thought–
action repertoires”. It is also suggested that positive emotions
“build” an individual’s “enduring resources”, including physical
resources (e.g., life longevity; Danner et al., 2001), intellectual
resources (e.g., theory of mind; Leslie, 1987), social resources
(e.g., relationship quality; Aron et al., 2000), and psychological
resources (e.g., resilience; Fredrickson et al., 2003). Speciﬁcally,
the theory posits that, over time, experiencing positive emotions
will have a cumulative eﬀect; enabling an individual to become
more creative, knowledgeable, resilient, socially integrated, and
healthy, and providing them with resources that can be
utilized as necessary in the future. Frederickson outlines that
negative emotions have the opposite eﬀect; preventing one
from thinking broadly and from building lasting psychological
reserves, however, the theory is unique in that it focuses
primarily on the positive inﬂuence of emotion. For instance,
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) propose that positive emotions
have an evolutionary advantage over time as they build resources,
whilst negative emotions have an evolutionary advantage ‘in the
moment’ as they allow an individual to focus on a threat and the
response to a threat.
Initial support for the broaden-and-build theory came from
research suggesting that positive emotions result in an expansion
of thoughts and actions (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2001). Individuals experiencing positive mood states
display increased levels of ﬂexibility (Isen and Daubman, 1984),
openness to information (Estrada et al., 1997), creativity and
social openness (Isen et al., 1987; Baas et al., 2008; Garland
et al., 2010) and enhanced semantic processing (Rowe et al.,
2007). These studies demonstrate the ability of positive emotion
to broaden cognition. However, they employ a range of tasks
to measure the hypothesized expansion of thought–action
repertoires and do not speciﬁcally measure the broadening of
attention.
One task used to investigate the prediction that emotion
aﬀects the spread of attention is the global–local processing task
(Navon, 1977, 2003). In this task participants are presented with
large letters (global stimuli) composed of smaller letters (local
stimuli) and are asked to respond to either the global or local
feature. Findings consistently show a global precedence eﬀect
whereby responses are faster at the global level than the local
level, and responses to local features are slowed when these are
incompatible with the global feature (e.g., a global “H” comprised
of local “S” compared to a global “H” comprised of local
“H”). Research using this task has shown that negative moods
promote a local processing style (with participants focusing more
attention on the small letters) and positive moods induce a global
processing style (with more attention directed to the large letter).
It is argued that this reveals the narrowing of attention in negative
moods and the broadening of attention in positive moods (e.g.,
Derryberry and Tucker, 1994; Basso et al., 1996). A study by
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) also utilized a global–local
visual processing task, and found that positive mood resulted in
larger global biases compared to neutral mood. Participants were
asked to make a comparison judgment on two sets of stimuli
comprising both local and global features. The stimuli could be
compared at a global or a local level and ﬁndings revealed that
participants in a positive mood were more likely to compare on
the basis of global features. The study additionally showed that
negative mood did not have a narrowing eﬀect on processing (in
contrast to earlier ﬁndings).
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) conclude that positive
mood states broaden attentional resources; however, the global
precedence eﬀect would indicate that global processing is the
preferred processing style, and will be triggered automatically
when a stimulus is presented. In addition, more resources are
required to process information at a local level (in order to inhibit
the global feature). This does not ﬁt with the notion that the scope
of attention expands due to positive emotions (or narrows due
to negative emotions). We would therefore argue that positive
aﬀect is simply enhancing the bias toward global processing and
not expanding the scope of attention. It is also suggested that
the global–local processing task is not ideal for studying the
beneﬁts of positive emotion predicted in the broaden-and-build
theory.
Whilst there are limitations in using a global–local processing
task to investigate the eﬀects of emotion on attention, other
researchers provide support for the broaden-and-build theory
using alternative methods. In an eye-tracking study, Wadlinger
and Isaacowitz (2006) presented participants with three images
(one located in the center of the screen and two situated
in the periphery). Participants induced into a positive mood
state made more ﬁxations on the peripheral stimuli compared
to those induced into a neutral mood state. They conclude
that greater search in the periphery provides evidence for
a broadening of visual attention due to positive emotion.
However, the researchers compared eye movements in the
periphery and they did not take into account any eye movements
to the central image. The suggestion that positive moods
broaden attention is speciﬁc in that individuals do not simply
allocate attention more widely (potentially at the expense of
processing information at the center), but that the resources
available when one is in a positive mood are enhanced. This
should allow for an expansion of attention whereby increased
processing of peripheral information comes with no associated
cost to processing central information. The study conducted by
Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2006) is thus unable to conclude
that positive moods expand attentional resources and it is
argued that the ﬁndings are more indicative of a bias toward
viewing the displays at a more global level (participants pay
attention to the peripheral images at the expense of focal
information). In addition, their ﬁndings show that the increased
eye movements to the peripheral images only occurred when
these images were positive and therefore consistent with
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the mood state. Again, without monitoring eye movements
to the central image it is impossible to conclude whether
these ﬁndings support a broadening eﬀect, or if they merely
represent a bias of attentional resources toward mood-congruent
information.
Rowe et al. (2007) also argue that they have evidence of
positive emotions broadening attention. In their experiment,
positive and negative aﬀect was induced using music with
diﬀering mood altering properties (they also included a
neutral condition in which participants were instructed to
read information about Canada). In a modiﬁed version of
the Eriksen ﬂanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) they
presented participants with a central target that was ﬂanked by
compatible or incompatible distracters. The distance between
the target and distracters was manipulated and ﬁndings showed
that participants induced with positive mood suﬀered more
interference from far distance distracters compared to those
induced with neutral and sad moods (in the positive condition
participants showed signiﬁcantly slower response times to targets
when they were incompatible to the distracters).
This evidence (albeit showing a negative impact of positive
emotions) would initially suggest that in positive moods attention
will expand, therefore allowing an individual to process more
information (regardless of whether this information is relevant
or irrelevant to the task). Yet other studies have failed to
replicate these ﬁndings and there is now a growing body of
literature that casts doubt on the broaden-and-build theory
(and in particular, those ﬁndings demonstrating a broadening of
visual attention under positive mood conditions). For example,
a study by Bruyneel et al. (2013) partially replicated the ﬂanker
experiment of Rowe et al. (2007) but found no evidence for
a broadening of attention on the basis of positive mood.
In a second study Bruyneel et al. (2013) adopted a more
ecologically valid mood induction procedure, whereby positive
mood was induced by providing participants with positive
feedback following completion of a task designed to induce stress
(negative mood was induced by omitting this positive feedback
and there was no neutral condition). An identical ﬂanker task
was adopted and results showed no interaction between mood,
ﬂanker compatibility, and ﬂanker location on reaction times.
The researchers did ﬁnd that overall response times were larger
in the negative mood condition (regardless of ﬂanker location
or compatibility), although they acknowledged this eﬀect may
have been due to a lack of counterbalancing in the experiment
(the negative condition was always completed ﬁrst therefore
performance in the positive mood condition may have beneﬁtted
from a practice eﬀect).
We propose that previous research investigating the eﬀects of
emotion on attention has been ﬂawed due to the nature of the
tasks utilized. Rather than explicitly measuring the scope of visual
attention, many experimental paradigms have inadvertently
measured processing strategy (and do not necessarily reveal the
beneﬁts of positive emotions predicted by the broaden-and-build
theory). There are also many conﬂicting ﬁndings and results
appear to vary according to task demand and stimuli valence.
Further, whilst some studies do include conditions for positive,
negative, and neutral mood states, other research fails to include
either a negative condition, or a neutral (control) condition. As
such, the precise way in which emotion aﬀects attention cannot
be concluded.
The current study sought to investigate whether emotion has
an impact upon visual attention using a change detection ﬂicker
task. The change detection ﬂicker paradigm (Rensink et al., 1997)
involves presenting individuals with two images separated by a
brief inter-stimulus interval (ISI). The images are identical except
for one change and the task is to detect (and identify or locate) the
change as quickly as possible. In the standard ﬂicker paradigm,
the images continue to alternate separated by the ISI until the
change has been detected. Findings show that changes can take
a long time to ﬁnd (up to an average of 20 s; Shapiro, 2000),
despite the change being found easily when the ISI is removed.
The inability to ﬁnd the change is termed ‘change blindness’
(Rensink et al., 1997) and the eﬀect is explained through top–
down and bottom–up allocation of attention. Under normal
circumstances, when a change is made to the visual scene it elicits
a motion transient that captures attention automatically. The ISI
(or alternative, such as an eye movement) masks the motion
transient and the change must therefore be found using a more
controlled, eﬀortful search.
The change detection ﬂicker paradigm has been used to
measure many of the inﬂuences upon visual attention and
visual search. For example, changes made to salient features are
detected faster than changes to less salient features, revealing
an impact of bottom–up processing (e.g., Wright, 2005), and
change blindness is aﬀected by expertise (e.g., Werner and Thies,
2000), demonstrating the importance of top–down inﬂuences.
Relevant to the current study, ﬁndings also show that under
normal circumstances participants pay more attention to central
and focal stimuli than to peripheral stimuli, resulting in improved
change detection for central changes compared to peripheral
changes (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997).
Change blindness is a robust eﬀect and given the success of
the change detection paradigm in measuring the allocation of
attention, we propose that it is ideal for the current investigation.
Participants will be presented with neutral images and asked
to detect changes made to these images. Crucially the changes
will be made to the center or to the periphery of each image.
Three blocks of trials will be completed and prior to each one
participant will be induced into positive, negative, or neutral
mood states using images from the International Aﬀective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008). The IAPS is a large collection
of images that have each been rated for valence and arousal and
they have been successfully used to induce mood in a wide range
of studies (Jiamsanguanwong and Umemuro, 2014; Lee et al.,
2014; Limonero et al., 2015). On the basis of the broaden-and-
build theory it is predicted that in the positive mood condition
attentional resources will increase and peripheral changes will be
detected signiﬁcantly faster compared to the neutral condition. In
contrast, peripheral change detection will be signiﬁcantly slower
in the negative condition. Critically, any beneﬁt to peripheral
change detection under positive mood should come with no
associated cost to detection of central changes. This prediction
is made on the assumption that the broaden-and-build theory
argues for an overall expansion of attentional resources, rather
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than a bias to allocating resources to the wider surroundings at
the expense of central information.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
An opportunity sample of 51 (32 female) staﬀ and students
from the University of Salford aged between 18 and 44 years
(M = 24.78, SD = 6.43) participated in this study. Written
informed consent was gained from each participant after they
were given procedural information regarding the experiment.
Ethical approval was obtained from the College of Health
and Social Care Ethics Panel at the University of Salford. All
participants received a £10 inconvenience allowance.
Design
A within-participants design was used with two independent
variables; mood induced prior to the change detection task
(positive, neutral, or negative), and location of the changing
item in the change detection task (central or peripheral). The
dependent variables consisted of accuracy (percentage correct)
and response times (in seconds) to detect the changes. A measure
of positive and negative aﬀect was also recorded to validate the
method for inducing emotion.
Materials
The experiment was designed and run using E-Prime
(Psychological Software Tools, Inc.) and participants completed
the study using a Viglen Intel Quad Core computer with a
60 Hz, 19 inch monitor. Emotion was manipulated by presenting
participants with visual images of diﬀering emotional valence
from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008). A total of 80 images were
selected, 20 positive (mean valence 7.65, mean arousal 5.05), 20
neutral (mean valence 4.62, mean arousal 3.11), and 20 negative
(mean valence 2.35, mean arousal 5.17) images were presented
during mood induction. Twenty additional positive images were
presented at the end of the experiment (mean valence 7.87,
mean arousal 5.13). No additional considerations were taken
into account when choosing the experimental stimuli (i.e., the
type of positive or negative mood evoked by each image). Please
see Supplementary Material for a list of IAPS images used in this
experiment. All images were presented in color and measured a
maximum of 1024× 768 pixels.
A total of 180 neutral images were used for the change
detection task. Thirty six original images were taken by the
authors (both indoor and outdoor scenes) and one central
and one peripheral change was made to each image (making
a further 72 images). All changes were deletions (one item
in the scene disappeared) and care was taken to ensure that
changes were all of a similar size. Central changes were made
within the center of each image (within an area measuring
512 × 384 pixels) and peripheral changes were made outside
of this area (see Supplementary Material). There were an equal
number of peripheral changes made on the right and left side of
the images. For each changed image a response screen was also
created. This consisted of the original image separated into four
equal sections that each contained a red letter (A, B, C, and D) to
allow participants to indicate the location of a change. All images
in the change detection task measured 1024× 768 pixels.
The Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988), a 20-item self-report measure was used to record
participants’ mood after presentation of aﬀective stimuli. The
measure consists of 20 words that describe positive and negative
feelings and emotions. The words were presented in a random
order and for each one participants were asked to “indicate to
what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present
moment” on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5
(extremely). The PANAS provides a measure of positive aﬀect
from the summed rating of all positive words and a measure of
negative aﬀect from the summed rating of the negative words.
The minimum score for eachmeasure is 10 (indicating low aﬀect)
and the maximum is 50.
Procedure
After providing written informed consent participants were
seated approximately 22 inches from the screen and given full
instructions about the task. If they were happy to proceed with the
experiment they pressed the spacebar and were presented with 20
images from the IAPS. The images were shown for 5000 ms each
in a random order, with a 500 ms ISI separating each one, and
participants were asked to view these pictures naturally. Once all
images had been presented on-screen instructions were given for
participants to complete the PANAS. Following this participants
pressed the spacebar again to begin the change detection task
(Figure 1). A total of 24 change detection trials were completed,
consisting of 12 central changes and 12 peripheral changes (6 to
the left and 6 to the right). In each trial an image was presented
for 1000 ms followed by a blue blank screen for 500 ms. The
changed image was then presented for 1000 ms, again followed
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the change detection flicker task. Participants
were presented with an image for 1000 ms followed by an inter-stimulus
interval (ISI; blank screen) for 500 ms. A changed image was then presented
for 1000 ms followed by another ISI for 500 ms. This procedure continued
until the participant identified the change in the scene and pressed the
spacebar. They were then required to state where the change occurred by
pressing the corresponding letter on the response screen. In this example the
change was located in the center of the image and the correct response
was ‘B’.
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by the blue screen for 500 ms. Participants were instructed
to search for the change between the two images and they
continued to alternate until participants pressed the spacebar to
indicate they had located the change. A response screen was then
presented and participants reported the location of the change
by pressing the relevant key on the keyboard (A, B, C, or D).
Participants were told that the changes may be diﬃcult to spot
and if they were unable to locate the change they had the option
of pressing ‘9’ to end a trial, however, they were asked to only
use that as a “last resort”. All trials were presented in a random
order.
Participants completed three blocks that each followed the
above procedure (viewing of the IAPS images, completion of
the PANAS, the change detection task). In the ﬁrst block the
IAPS images were either positive or negative (counterbalanced
across participants). In the second block the images were always
neutral, and in the ﬁnal block they were again positive or negative
depending on the valence of the ﬁrst set of images. In the change
detection task all 36 pairs of stimuli were shown twice (once with
a central change and once with a peripheral change). The same
image could not be presented twice in a single block.
Following completion of the ﬁnal change detection task
participants were presented with 20 further positive images from
the IAPS (presented for 5000ms each with an ISI of 500ms). This
was to make certain that participants were induced into a positive
mood when leaving the lab. At this point they were also thanked
for their time and given an inconvenience allowance.
RESULTS
Data collected included accuracy and response times to the
change detection task and a positive and negative aﬀect score
from the PANAS. The analysis for each measure is presented
below.
Affect Scores
The aﬀect scores were taken to validate the mood induction
technique (presenting participants with images from the IAPS).
Positive and negative scores were analyzed separately using a one-
way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) followed
by planned comparisons to compare the positive and negative
conditions to the neutral condition. Analysis of the positive aﬀect
scores showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of mood, F(2,100) = 36.12,
MSE = 32.85, p< 0.001, partial η2 = 0.42. Planned comparisons
show that viewing positive stimuli signiﬁcantly increased positive
mood scores compared to viewing neutral stimuli (M = 30.80,
SD = 8.16 vs. M = 22.35, SD = 8.66; F(1,50) = 63.98,
MSE = 56.93, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.56; Figure 2A).
There were no diﬀerences in positive aﬀect after viewing
negative stimuli (M = 22.55) compared to neutral stimuli
[F(1,50) = 0.031, MSE = 63.76, p = 0.862, partial η2 = 0.00;
Figure 2A]. Analysis of negative aﬀect also showed a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of mood, F(2,100)= 45.97,MSE= 19.78, p< 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.48. Planned comparisons reveal that viewing negative
stimuli signiﬁcantly increased negative mood scores compared to
viewing neutral stimuli (M = 20.75, SD = 7.60 vs. M = 13.90,
SD = 4.98; F(1,50) = 57.01, MSE = 41.90, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.53; Figure 2B). There was no diﬀerence in negative
aﬀect between the positive (M = 13.04) and neutral conditions
[F(1,50) = 1.381, MSE = 27.48, p = 0.245, partial η2 = 0.03;
Figure 2B].
Change Detection Task
Two 2 (location) × 3 (mood) repeated measures ANOVAs
were completed to investigate the inﬂuence of emotion on the
allocation of attention in the change detection task. Analysis of
accuracy revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of location, F(1,50)= 4.756,
MSE = 0.01, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.09. Central changes
were detected more accurately (M = 90.56%, SD = 11.91)
than peripheral changes (M = 88.42%, SD = 12.59; see
Figure 3). However, there was a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of emotion,
F(2,100) = 0.241, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.786, partial η2 = 0.01,
and no signiﬁcant interaction between location and emotion,
F(2,100)= 2.127,MSE = 0.01, p= 0.125, partial η2 = 0.04.
For reaction time there was again a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
location, F(1,50) = 6.888, MSE = 9.005, p < 0.01, partial
η2 = 0.12. Central changes were identiﬁed quicker than
peripheral changes (M = 10.77 s, SD = 3.69 vs. M = 11.67 s,
SD = 3.93; see Figure 4). There was no main eﬀect of emotion,
F(2,100) = 1.275, MSE = 12.395, p = 0.284, partial η2 = 0.03,
FIGURE 2 | Mean Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scores for each induced mood condition. Self-reported mood varied across the
conditions for both positive affect (A) and negative affect (B). Error bars = standard error of the mean.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean percentage accuracy in the change detection task.
Central changes were detected more accurately than peripheral changes but
this did not vary according to the mood induced prior to the task. Error
bars = standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 4 | Mean response time (in seconds) to correctly detect
changes. Central changes were detected faster than peripheral changes
across all mood conditions. Error bars = standard error of the mean.
and there was no interaction between location and emotion,
F(2,100) = 0.075,MSE = 11.191, p= 0.928, partial η2 = 0.00.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to investigate the impact of
emotion on visual attention. In particular the experiment was
designed to measure whether positive emotions broaden visual
attention, and whether negative emotions lead to attentional
narrowing. This was explored using a change detection ﬂicker
task which allowed for the manipulation of ‘location’ whereby
changes (centrally located or in the periphery) were made to
images and participants had to detect these changes as quickly
as possible. In accordance with the broaden-and-build-theory
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001), it was predicted that change blindness
would reduce for changes in the periphery when participants
were induced into positive mood but would increase when
negative mood was induced (compared to a neutral condition).
The change detection ﬂicker paradigm is a well-utilized
method for studying attention, and diﬀerences between detection
of central and peripheral changes have been evidenced in a
number of studies. For instance, Rensink et al. (1997) found that
changes to areas of central interest were detected faster than
changes to peripheral areas. The current ﬁndings support this
past research. Participants were signiﬁcantly more accurate and
signiﬁcantly quicker to locate central changes than peripheral
changes. This main eﬀect is very important in endorsing the
design of the ﬂicker experiment. To establish any impact of
emotion on the allocation of visual attention to central and
peripheral locations it was vital to ﬁrst show that visual attention
and search followed the expected pattern, with resources located
to the center of a scene before the periphery. We can therefore
have conﬁdence in the experimental paradigm.
Despite showing that attention is allocated to information at
the center of a scene before being allocated to the periphery, there
was no evidence that this varied according to mood. In contrast
to past research (e.g., Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Wadlinger
and Isaacowitz, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007) and contradicting the-
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001), participants
did not show a wider spread of attention when induced with
positive mood. The current study therefore gives no support to
the suggestion that positive emotions broaden attention (and that
negative emotions lead to attentional narrowing). This ﬁnding
was unexpected given that previous evidence has demonstrated
an eﬀect of emotion on attention (Fredrickson and Branigan,
2005; Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007). It
should be noted that despite the non-signiﬁcant interaction
between mood and location in the change detection task, there
was increased accuracy in detecting central changes compared
to peripheral changes in the positive condition. However, even
this non-signiﬁcant trend is inconsistent with the predictions of
the broaden-and-build theory as it provides no evidence for a
broadening of spatial attention under positive mood conditions.
At most we would argue that this eﬀect may be partially
responsible for the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between detection
accuracy of central and peripheral changes. In addition, in many
change blindness studies (including the current experiment) the
most important measure of performance is reaction time (rather
than accuracy) and analysis of this dependent variable shows no
comparable trend.
One possible explanation for the non-signiﬁcant eﬀect of
emotion in the current study could be that participants were not
successfully induced into the experimental mood conditions. For
instance the PANAS self-report data were collected immediately
after mood induction, and whilst analysis showed that emotion
was successfully induced, it is not known whether this induced
aﬀect persisted throughout the change detection task. Given
that the IAPS has been successfully used previously to induce
emotion in research studies (Jiamsanguanwong and Umemuro,
2014; Lee et al., 2014; Limonero et al., 2015), we would argue that
emotion was successfully induced but that this had no inﬂuence
upon attention, however, in future it would be prudent to collect
self-report data after each change detection block.
An alternative explanation for the current ﬁndings is that the
experimental paradigm measures visual processing in a diﬀerent
way to some of the former studies. By manipulating the location
of the changes the present study was able to investigate how
visual attention is allocated across a real-world scene. Under
standard viewing conditions an observer will allocate resources
to the center of a display before attending to the periphery (e.g.,
Brockmole and Henderson, 2006; Tatler, 2007) therefore central
changes will be detected faster than peripheral changes (as was
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found in the current experiment). If positive emotions expand
the available attentional resources then the scope of attention
should broaden (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001), allowing for faster
(and more accurate) detection of peripheral changes compared
to neutral or negative emotions (a prediction not supported by
the current ﬁndings). In earlier studies this central/peripheral
distinction was not possible. For instance, in some studies
supporting the broaden-and-build theory participants are asked
to make a judgment about one feature of a single stimulus
or a small set of highly similar stimuli (the global–local task,
e.g., Derryberry and Tucker, 1994; Basso et al., 1996, and the
ﬂanker task; e.g., Rowe et al., 2007). We argue that these tasks
measure visual processing style (i.e., global or local) rather than
the spatial allocation of attention and are therefore unable to test
the claim that positive emotions expand attentional resources.
Taking the past ﬁndings into consideration, the current results
would indicate that positive moods do not enhance attentional
resources; they merely bias the observer toward a particular
method of processing information. This bias cannot be tested
using the current methodology, yet incorporating global and local
changes into a change detection paradigm may be one way to
explore this further.
One study that comes close to measuring how visual attention
is allocated through space and how emotion inﬂuences this
was conducted by Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2006). Similar
to the current experiment they used natural scenes and
measured search (via eye-tracking) to peripheral information.
Their ﬁndings are, however, limited given that they did not
analyze eye-movements to the center of the display, and they
also utilized a display containing three separate images. This
again does not allow for a true measure of how attention
moves within a scene and lacks ecological validity. The study
did support the broaden-and-build theory by showing that
participants made more ﬁxations on peripheral information
under positive mood conditions, yet this only occurred when
the information was mood-congruent. Supporting the ﬁndings
of Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2006), other studies have shown
that the inﬂuence of emotion on cognition can be dependent
upon the characteristics of the speciﬁc task stimuli used. For
example, Grol et al. (2014) argue that positive emotion broadens
attention but only when the stimuli are self-related. These
ﬁndings suggest caution when interpreting the present results.
It is possible that participants were induced into mood states
as a result of viewing emotionally valenced stimuli (validated
by the PANAS scores), only for the change detection task
stimuli (which consisted of neutral images) to return mood to
neutral.
The variation in ﬁndings in this ﬁeld thus outline the
importance of the experimental task used to investigate any
impact of emotion on attention. The paradigms used range
from very simple tasks with a relatively low level of diﬃculty
(e.g., the ﬂanker task) to more demanding tasks incorporating
real-world stimuli. It is also possible that emotion has diﬀering
inﬂuences on overt attention (e.g., measured by Wadlinger and
Isaacowitz (2006) and the current study) and covert attention
(e.g., measured by Bradley et al., 2000; Rowe et al., 2007). This
makes comparison across diﬀerent experiments very diﬃcult.
It also suggests that any impact of emotion may be inﬂuenced
by the characteristics of a task, for example the stimuli used
and the demand of the task. This argument could be made
about the paradigm used in the current study and it may be
possible that the change detection ﬂicker task was too diﬃcult
to elicit any inﬂuence of emotion. Whilst participants in the
current experiment took signiﬁcantly less time to detect changes
(a mean of 11.3 s) compared to some change detection tasks
(up to 20 s; Shapiro, 2000), the diﬃculty of the task may
have masked any potential inﬂuence of emotion on change
blindness. Completion of a change detection task requires
cognitive control to allow for focused attention toward relevant
information and inhibition of irrelevant information. Regulating
emotion also involves cognitive control processes whereby an
individual may try to inhibit an inappropriate or unwanted
response. It is therefore highly likely that task diﬃculty interacts
with any impact of emotion, a suggestion supported by the
study of Jasinska et al. (2012). In their study using the multi-
source interference task (Bush and Shin, 2006) participants
were presented with three numbers and had to identify an
oddball number with a corresponding button press. The spatial
position of the oddball could be congruent or incongruent to
the correct response and on some trials threatening or rewarding
distracters were also presented. Responses were slower with
both threatening and rewarding distracters (compared to no
distractor) for incongruent trials, but not for congruent trials.
These data demonstrate that task diﬃculty can mitigate the
inﬂuence of emotion on attention.
A further inﬂuence that may have contributed to the impact
of task diﬃculty was if participants were trying to regulate
their emotions during the change detection task. Emotional
distraction occurring within a cognitive task depends on
interactions between cognitive systems that allow an individual
to stay focused on the task, and those systems that are
responsible for the processing of emotional information (Dolcos
et al., 2011). Here it is proposed that the two systems
compete for processing resources where emotional distractors
result in bottom–up processing of task irrelevant information
and adversely inﬂuence task performance. This deﬁcit in
task performance can be mitigated by utilizing top–down
cognitive control processes. Detrimental inﬂuences of emotional
distraction on task performance have been seen in studies using
clinical and healthy populations (Jasinska et al., 2012; Krause-
Utz et al., 2012). This is a possible avenue for further study as
the current experiment did not take into account any inﬂuence
of emotional regulation. However, if participants were using
cognitive resources to manage their emotions and inhibit the
emotional distraction following viewing of the IAPS stimuli
we would expect better performance in the neutral condition
compared to the both the positive and negative condition and
this was not found. As a consequence it is unlikely that emotional
regulation can explain the lack of any inﬂuence of emotion on
attention in this study and instead other factors may play a
role.
Cognitive theories attempt to explain behavior in terms
of average group level performance; however, these models
often ﬁt less accurately when they are applied to individuals
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(Parasuraman and Giambra, 1991). It is therefore possible that
individual diﬀerences can mitigate any eﬀect of emotion on
cognition. For example, state and trait negative aﬀect have
been shown to have separate and combined inﬂuences on
attentional processing (Crocker et al., 2012). The complexity of
the relationship between emotion and visual attention due to
individual diﬀerences is demonstrated in a study conducted by
Grol and De Raedt (2014). Facial stimuli of varying emotions
(happy, sad, and neutral) were used to investigate the inﬂuence of
stimuli valence (under positive and neutral mood) on attentional
breadth and participants were given the task of locating a
small target appearing at varying distances from the face. The
researchers also took a measure of depressive symptoms using
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996).
Mood and stimuli valence had no inﬂuence on attentional
breadth and only an eﬀect of distance was observed whereby
accuracy was higher when the target was presented closer to
the facial stimuli. However, participants with high BDI-II scores
showed greater attentional narrowing in the task under positive
emotion. Further, among individuals with high BDI-II scores,
increases in positive mood were related to more pronounced
attentional narrowing for positive stimuli. For participants with
low BDI-II scores, increases in positive mood were related to
attentional broadening for positive stimuli. It therefore appears
that individual diﬀerences can mitigate the inﬂuence of emotion
on visual attention. The current study did not take account of
individual mood or depressive symptoms and this needs to be
investigated further. Research investigating the role of individual
diﬀerences on emotion and cognition is important as it will help
to understand functioning in healthy populations as well as those
factors that may increase susceptibility to a range of aﬀective
disorders.
CONCLUSION
Using a change detection ﬂicker task there was no evidence
that mood aﬀects visual attention. The ﬁndings are consistent
with the view that research showing a broadening eﬀect of
positive emotion and a narrowing eﬀect of negative emotion
may instead demonstrate a bias toward a particular processing
strategy rather than a broadening of the available attentional
resources. Consequently, the broadening role of positive emotion
on visual attention may not be as simple as the broaden-and-
build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) outlines. We propose that
studies using simplistic tasks in which participants attend to a
very limited set of features cannot adequately test the eﬀects
of emotion on spatial attention. The change detection ﬂicker
task oﬀers a more eﬀective measure of attention under diﬀering
emotional conditions as (1) the spatial location of stimuli can be
controlled to allow for a comparison of central and peripheral
attention, (2) the experiment paradigm allows for the use of
real-world stimuli, and (3) the task is more complex and this
provides a method for exploring how individual diﬀerences in
attentional control and mood moderate the inﬂuence of emotion
on cognition. There is a growing body of research showing that
any inﬂuence of emotion on visual attention is aﬀected by task
constraints (e.g., the type of stimuli and the valence of this
stimuli) and task diﬃculty and these can all be manipulated
using the change detection paradigm. Research also shows that
individual diﬀerences mitigate the eﬀects of emotion on attention
and there is scope to expand on this work to investigate whether
such inﬂuences have contributed to the current ﬁndings.
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